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A growing literature emphasises the importance of non-state actors, both 
non-governmental organisations and corporations, in international relations 
since the late twentieth century. It is, however, often overlooked that 
business diplomacy and the influence of organised private actors on 
international economic relations has a much longer history. Relatedly, the 
workings of business associations that operated globally and represented 
more than one chamber of commerce have so far not been adequately 
analysed within the historical literature on business pressure groups. This 
dissertation will show that the businesspeople organised within the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), founded in 1920, possessed a 
high degree of influence on financial and economic diplomacy in the 1920s. 
Key members of the Chamber participated in reparations negotiations and 
collaborated closely with the Economic and Financial Organisation of the 
League of Nations. Through these channels of influence, the ICC could 
become one of the most important agents of economic globalisation in the 
interwar period. An analysis of ICC primary sources from the 1920s will 
provide readers with a new interpretation of the determinants of 
transatlantic capital movements after the conclusion of the Dawes Plan, 
evidence for the early contributions of business to global governance, an 
actor-centred view on globalisation processes, and a more nuanced 




1.  Introduction  
In 1970, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman famously stated that, essentially, the 
business of business is business alone. Friedman argued that businesspeople 
cannot have social responsibilities beyond the limits of the corporation and that 
all desires of business to pursue political goals would cause greater damage than 
good.1 The representatives of business associations, who founded the completely 
 
1 Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” The New 





private International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1920, could not have 
disagreed more. The self-proclaimed “merchants of peace”2 were naturally 
interested in topics that were of immediate concern to global business, like 
commercial arbitration, dismantling of trade barriers, or protecting private 
property. However, ICC members also wanted to contribute to international 
politics by offering its services to solve the most contentious political issues at the 
time: German reparations and worldwide financial and economic stabilisation.3 
The Chamber was created, in the words of its first Vice-President, “free from 
motives for private gain”, and to build “a great structure of international 
goodwill”.4 Although the ICC as a whole and important individual members of the 
Chamber were highly influential in post-World War One economic diplomacy, its 
role in interwar diplomatic and economic history remains under-researched.5 In 
the following, I will demonstrate the oftentimes overlooked importance of the ICC 
in economic diplomacy during the 1920s and explain how internationally 
organised business could become one of the most important agents of economic 
and financial globalisation between 1920 and 1931.   
 
Since the end of the Cold War, a growing literature has emphasised the rising 
power of multi-national companies (MNCs) in international relations and the 
increasing importance of business diplomacy in shaping globalisation processes.6 
However, organised business was an influential actor in setting the rules of 
 
2 G. L. Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace: Twenty Years of Business Diplomacy Through the 
International Chamber of Commerce (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938). 
3 Bob Reinalda, The Routledge History of International Organizations from 1815 to the Present 
Day (London, New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 145. 
4 International Chamber of Commerce, The Record of the International Chamber of Commerce 
No. 1. March 1921, LSE Library. HF294, 5. 
5 Clotilde Druelle-Korn, “The Great War. Matrix of the International Chamber of Commerce, a 
Fortunate Business League of Nations,” in The Impact of the First World War on International 
Business, ed. Andrew Smith, Simon Mollan and Kevin D. Tennent (New York: Routledge Taylor 
& Francis Group, 2017), 115; Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of 
Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2018), 34. 
6 See exemplary: John Mikler, “Global Companies as Actors in Global Policy and Global 
Governance,” in The Handbook of Global Companies, ed. John Mikler (Chichester: John Wiley & 
Sons Inc, 2013); Parag Khanna, The World Economic Forum: An Anatomy of Multi-Stakeholder 
Global Policy-Making: Ph.D. Thesis Submitted at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science (London, 2010), accessed April 10, 2021, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2389/1/U615338.pdf; 
Huub Ruël and Tim Wolters, “Business Diplomacy,” in The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy, ed. 
Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr and Paul Sharp (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2016). 
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globalisation long before the most recent acceleration of worldwide economic 
integration since the 1990s. By analysing primary sources from the early history 
of the ICC, this dissertation will shed a new light on business diplomacy and the 
global history of business pressure groups, thereby scrutinising how the ICC 
became “a key institution in rebuilding (…) the ‘shattered world’ of the global 
economy” after the end of World War One.7 My following analysis will answer 
three fundamental questions: In which areas of global economic governance was 
the ICC most influential from its creation in 1920 until the beginning of the Great 
Depression? How did the Chamber influence economic and financial globalisation, 
i.e. how did it suggest and create certain regimes governing cross-border flows of 
capital and goods? What were the consequences of its actions in the interwar 
period? 
 
In its first years, the ICC was most actively involved in the issue of reparations 
which was the biggest obstacle for economic reconstruction and political 
reconciliation after World War One.8 Further, the ICC worked closely together 
with the Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations. The ICC, 
which was quickly labelled a “businessmen’s League of Nations”,9 was especially 
influential in the interwar period, because US representatives were dominant 
within the Chamber, while the US government never joined the actual League of 
Nations.10 Because the USA became a net creditor to the world after World War 
One, an unrivalled economic superpower, and due to the rise of US multinationals 
 
7 Slobodian, Globalists, 34. 
8 Barry Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 127; Harold James, “Introduction: Interpreting the 
Great Depression,” in The Interwar Depression in an International Context, ed. Harold James 
and Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (München: Oldenbourg, 2002), X. 
9 Monika Rosengarten and Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, “Economic Policy Positions and Influence of 
the International Chamber of Commerce During the Great Depression,” in James; Müller-
Luckner, The Interwar Depression in an International Context, 35. 
10 Thomas David and Pierre Eichenberger, “Business and Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: A 
Corporatist View,” Diplomatica 2, no. 1 (2020): 55; Druelle-Korn, “The Great War. Matrix of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, a Fortunate Business League of Nations,” 116; Monika 
Rosengarten, Die Internationale Handelskammer: Wirtschaftspolitische Empfehlungen in Der 
Zeit Der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929-1939 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 17–18. 
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in the 1920s, American membership in the ICC gave the Chamber more weight in 
international diplomacy.11  
 
A thorough analysis of the concrete ways how the ICC shaped economic diplomacy 
will provide readers with a more nuanced understanding of transnational business 
history during the interwar period, an actor-centred view on historical 
globalisation processes, and an account of  the early contributions of organised 
business in “securing the world economy”.12 In more detail, the analysis of ICC 
archival material will reveal why the effective seniority of private credit over 
governmental debt was included in the Dawes Plan, which led to the 
unsustainable transatlantic capital flows in the latter half of the 1920s, and 
contributed to the spread of the Great Depression to Europe in 1931.13 In this 
specific case, as well as in the general historiography of the interwar period, 
existing historical research remains deficient, as it focusses mainly on the analysis 
of supposedly objective national interests and relies on national archival 
material.14 The following analysis of ICC and League material during the 1920s 
will demonstrate how powerful “transnational interests” were forceful 
determinants of globalisation during the 1920s. 
 
11 This hope is also expressed by Viscount Birkenhead, the first Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, 
in his speech at the first Congress of the ICC, see International Chamber of Commerce, 
Proceedings of the First Congress. London, June 27 – July 1, 1921, LSE Library. HF 294, 32–33. 
On the US becoming a leader in aggregate economic output, global trade, and international 
lending after World War One, see: Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking of 
Global Order 1916-1931 (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 12–13; Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 82; 
Derek Howard Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919–1929 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1977), 240; On the expansion of American business abroad in the 1920s: Mira 
Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from 1914 to 1970 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), 163. 
12 Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-
1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
13 Tobias Straumann, 1931: Debt, Crisis, and the Rise of Hitler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019), 12–14; Albrecht Ritschl, “The German Transfer Problem, 1920–33: A Sovereign-Debt 
Perspective,” European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire 19, no. 6 (2012): 944. 
14 Ritschl enumerates some possible reasons for the priority of private credit, but does not 
mention the influence of the ICC: Ritschl, “The German transfer problem, 1920–33: a sovereign-
debt perspective,” 953. Gomes and Straumann also claim that the seniority of private loans over 
reparations was one of the most important features of the Dawes Plan, but do not mention the 
role of the ICC either: Leonard Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932: A Historical Survey 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 155; Straumann, 1931, 31–32. Tooze focusses almost 
entirely on the agency of national politicians in interwar history: Tooze, The Deluge. 
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In the following sections, I will contextualise the organisational structure and 
history of the ICC within the broader historiography of business associations and 
discuss my methodology and the primary sources which will form the basis of the 
ensuing analysis. Thereafter, I will first analyse the ICC’s influence on the 
negotiations of the Dawes Plan and, second, demonstrate how closely the ICC 
worked together with the League of Nations. In the final section, I will explain 
why the influence of the ICC waned with the global spread of the Great Depression 
in the early 1930s, when globalisation “ended” or “collapsed”.15  
 
 
2. Organisational Structure of the ICC 
At the time of its founding, the ICC, an organisation which exists until today, was 
made up of National Committees, which represented the most important business 
associations and corporations from the industrial and financial sector of the 
respective state.16 The National Committees could send delegates to the Council 
of the ICC, which administered the Chamber’s affairs and was responsible for 
implementing the resolutions passed at the bi-yearly congresses. National 
Committees were a crucial channel of influence for the ICC, as their task was to 
lobby governments to adopt policies which would reflect ICC resolutions.17 The 
Council chose an executive committee of not more than twelve members, which 
assisted the President of the Chamber, who is also elected by the Council.18 The 
ICC Council consisted of three permanent members from the five founding 
countries – Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy and the USA – and three from 
other National Committees.19 In addition to the National Committees, the ICC 
 
15 Harold James, The End of Globalization: Lessons from the Great Depression (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2011); Robert W. D. Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse 
of Globalization (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
16 International Chamber of Commerce, The Organization of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Brochure No. 20. 1922, LSE Library Archives Special. HF/E110, 9. 
17 From the beginning, the most important resolutions were forwarded to the Prime Ministers 
and Foreign Secretaries of the five founding countries, see: International Chamber of Commerce, 
The Record of the International Chamber of Commerce No. 1. March 1921, 11. 
18 International Chamber of Commerce, The Organization of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Brochure No. 20. 1922, 8. 
19 Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, International Chamber of Commerce. 
A Federation of the Industrial, Financial and Business Forces of the Principal Countries of the 
World. 1920-21, LSE Library Archives Special. HF/B132, 12. 
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comprised Select Committees that dealt with specific topics. It was their task to 
prepare the group discussions at the congresses and work on possible 
implementations of the resolutions.20 
 
Membership in the ICC could take two forms – organisational or associate. 
Organisational membership was confined to business associations, which were 
united in National Committees. Associate membership was reserved for 
corporations and individuals.21 Only National Committees were allowed to vote 
within the ICC, associate members could participate in a consultative function at 
the congresses.22 Membership in the ICC expanded quickly. Two years after its 
creation, the ICC had overall 1000 members, 403 of which were organisational 
members and 593 associate members, while 15 National Committees already 
joined the Chamber.23 Membership grew continuously and the most important 
business associations from all over the world met in the ICC, rendering it “one of 
the cornerstones of 20th century diplomacy.”24 
 
 
3. The ICC in the Context of the History of Chambers of Commerce 
Chambers of Commerce were first formed in mid-eighteenth-century Europe, 
when global conflicts, like the Seven Years’ War (1756-63) and the American War 
of Independence (1775-81) disrupted crucial trading routes, and government 
interference in the economy and taxation increased. English merchants 
understood that they needed to organise collectively to influence legislation in 
their favour and respond appropriately to new challenges.25 The first chambers 
 
20 International Chamber of Commerce, Proceedings of the First Congress. London, June 27 – 
July 1, 1921, 7. 
21 Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, International Chamber of Commerce. 
A Federation of the Industrial, Financial and Business Forces of the Principal Countries of the 
World. 1920-21, 17. 
22 Rosengarten, Die Internationale Handelskammer, 41. 
23 International Chamber of Commerce, The Record of the International Chamber of Commerce 
No. 4. May 1922, LSE Library. HF294, 113–14. 
24 David and Eichenberger, “Business and Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: a Corporatist 
View,” 51. 
25 Robert Bennett, Local Business Voice: The History of Chambers of Commerce in Britain, 
Ireland, and Revolutionary America, 1760-2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 16. 
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were mostly local and situated in large trading ports, while governmental 
centralisation during the nineteenth century demanded the creation of national 
business associations.26   
 
The first international conference of businesspeople took place in 1869, while 
regular conferences of national chambers of commerce were organised by a 
permanent committee in Liège, Belgium, from 1905 onwards.27 At the 1919 
conference of chambers of commerce in Atlantic City, it was decided to establish a 
formal organisation which should be a “continuously operating nucleus” for 
advancing the interests of business globally.28 In June 1920, the ICC was founded 
in Paris.29 
 
The existing historical and theoretical literature on chambers of commerce and 
business pressure groups analyses chambers exclusively from a local, national, or 
comparative viewpoint.30 The workings of business associations that operated 
globally and represented more than one chamber of commerce have so far not been 
adequately analysed.31 Like the exogenous shocks of the late eighteenth century 
that resulted in the formation of the first local chambers of commerce, World War 
One also represents a critical juncture in history which created the demand for a 
global association of businesspeople to influence politics on an international scale. 
At a time of worldwide political rupture, business took an increasing interest in 
global governance. 
 
26 Ibid., 7. 
27 Reinalda, The Routledge History of International Organizations from 1815 to the Present Day, 
144. 
28 Rosengarten, Die Internationale Handelskammer, 31. 
29 Druelle-Korn, “The Great War. Matrix of the International Chamber of Commerce, a Fortunate 
Business League of Nations,” 105–6. 
30 See exemplary: Eugene Ridings, “Chambers of Commerce and Business Elites in Great Britain 
and Brazil in the Nineteenth Century: Some Comparisons,” The Business History Review 75, 
no. 4 (2001); Richard H. Werking, “Bureaucrats, Businessmen, and Foreign Trade: The Origins of 
the United States Chamber of Commerce,” Business History Review 52, no. 3 (1978); F. G. 
Castles, “Business and Government: A Typology of Pressure Group Activity,” Political Studies 27, 
no. 2 (1969); Bennett, Local Business Voice. 
31 A notable exception that analyses the activities of a federated Chamber of Commerce in the 
context of British Imperialism in Africa is Ayodeji Olukoju, “The Pressure Group Activity of 
Federated Chambers of Commerce: The Joint West Africa Committee and the Colonial Office, C. 
1903–1955,” African Economic History 46, no. 2 (2018). 
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During the war, governments imposed heavy restrictions on production, finance 
and trade, while they also co-opted existing chambers of commerce to attain a 
tighter grip on the economy.32 This increased collaboration between organised 
business and politics was one of the most pronounced legacies of the war in the 
industrialised countries of Europe and North America.33 The 1920s were thus the 
decade of “corporatism”, during which policy making shifted away from 
parliaments to bilateral negotiations between ministries and business interest 
groups.34 The need to extend this corporatist collaboration onto a global scale after 
the war is reiterated by Lucien Dior, the French Minister of Commerce, at an 
address to the ICC in 1921: 
 
 “Thirty years of practical experience as a man of business have 
convinced me that collaboration between governments and 
businessmen is the only effective means of getting things done. Such 
collaboration is impossible without an organisation which not only will 
afford opportunity for the free interchange of views between leaders of 
finance, industry and commerce throughout the world, but also will 
serve as the mouth-piece by which businessmen may make their views 
known to their governments.”35 
 
Further, the war fundamentally transformed the manufacturing landscape in 
Europe, which experienced the spread of American MNCs. US foreign direct 
investment in Europe increased from $2.7 billion to $3.9 billion between 1914 and 
1919.36 Especially prominent members of the large American National Committee 
of the ICC, such as the head of General Electric (GE) and the Radio Corporation 
of America (RCA), Owen D. Young, expanded their business hugely in Europe 
during the 1920s, and were thus highly dependent on the provision of knowledge 
about foreign rules and regulations and the joint lobbying efforts by the ICC.37  
 
32 Bennett, Local Business Voice, 38; Tooze, The Deluge, 199. 
33 James, The End of Globalization, 114. 
34 Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in 
the Decade After World War I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 10; Michael J. 
Hogan, “Corporatism,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Frank 
Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 43. 
35 International Chamber of Commerce, The International Chamber of Commerce in 1921. Digest 
No. 9. 1921, LSE Library Archives Special. FOLIO FHF/68, 1. 
36 Wilkins, The Maturing of Multinational Enterprise, 30–31. 
37 General Electric was especially present in Germany. It purchased $11 million in Siemens, the 
second-largest electrical company in Germany during the 1920s and bought a substantial 
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Moreover, the outcome of the war produced new nation-states and tariff barriers, 
while the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the wartime prohibitions on foreign 
ownership throughout Europe led to numerous expropriations, and the 
abandonment of the pre-war gold standard rendered exchange rates less stable 
and cross-border trade more difficult.38 All this made international business 
riskier and reinforced the need for business to influence government policies and 
for the creation of an organisation which was able to represent the general 
interests of the global business community.39 In sum, World War One undermined 
the foundations of the liberal global economy of the nineteenth century, while, 
simultaneously, “governments and societies of Europe were interlocked as never 
before”, due to reparations and the vast accumulation of international debts 
during the war.40 The existing literature on chambers of commerce has highlighted 
how certain historical developments supported the creation of local and national 
chambers of commerce, while the global scale of connections between business and 
politics from 1920 onwards remains under-researched. 
 
 
4. Previous Works on the ICC 
There are only three published books that were written specifically on the history 
of the ICC. One is a German dissertation by Monika Rosengarten which focusses 
on the economic policy positions of the ICC during the Great Depression, the 
second is the book “Merchants of Peace” by G.L. Ridgeway.41 The latter is solely 
descriptive and sympathetic to the Chamber. Ridgeway was commissioned by the 
Carnegie Foundation to write the book in 1938.42 The third book, also in German, 
takes a cultural angle on the history of the ICC and deals with the discursive 
 
minority holding in AEG, the largest electrical manufacturer in Germany in 1929, see ibid., 67-
68. 
38 Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-
First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 203; Slobodian, Globalists, 21; 
Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 20. 
39 Geoffrey Jones, “Firms and Global Capitalism,” in The Cambridge History of 
Capitalism: Volume 2: The Spread of Capitalism: From 1848 to the Present, ed. Larry Neal and 
Jeffrey G. Williamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 179. 
40 Tooze, The Deluge, 251. 
41 Rosengarten, Die Internationale Handelskammer; Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace. 
42 Rosengarten, Die Internationale Handelskammer, 20–21. 
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construction of “Business Statesmanship” and temporality by the ICC.43 
Additionally, Shane Tomashot wrote an unpublished dissertation about the early 
history of the ICC in which he analyses the influence of its members on post-World 
War One political economy but does not discuss the Chamber’s contribution to the 
Dawes Plan in great detail.44 Moreover, several journal articles on the work of the 
ICC were published, which either do not rely extensively on primary sources 
published by the ICC or do not focus on the interwar period.45 Further, Michelle 
d’Allessandro pointed to the collaboration between the League and the ICC and 
Clotilde Druelle-Korn wrote a chapter in which she highlights the importance of 
the ICC as an actor in the interwar period.46 Both do not analyse ICC primary 
sources and Druelle-Korn emphasises that there is much need for additional 
research.47   
 
Previous research on the ICC as a diplomatic actor in the interwar period remains 
scarce, especially given the Chamber’s eminent importance during that time. 
There are only few analytical works based on primary sources by the ICC, which 
focus on the early history of the Chamber. Additionally, in influential works on 
the history of German reparation regimes or the economic work of the League of 
Nations, the influence of the ICC is not discussed.48 A primary source-based 
 
43 Susanne-Sophia Spiliotis, Die Zeit Der Wirtschaft: "Business Statesmanship" Und Die 
Geschichte Der Internationalen Handelskammer (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2019). 
44 Shane R. Tomashot, Selling Peace: The History of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
1919-1925: Dissertation, Georgia State University (2015), accessed June 19, 2021, 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/history_diss/43/. 
45 Kurt Wilk, “International Organization and the International Chamber of Commerce,” 
Political Science Quarterly 55, no. 2 (1940); Dominic Kelly, “The International Chamber of 
Commerce,” New Political Economy 10, no. 2 (2005); David and Eichenberger, “Business and 
Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: a Corporatist View” 
46 Michele d'Allesandro, “Seeking Governance for World Markets: The League of Nations 
Between Corporatism and Public Opinion, 1925-1929,” European Business History Association - 
XIth Annual Conference, 2007, accessed December 29, 2020, 
https://ebha.org/ebha2007/pdf/Alessandro.pdf; Michele d'Allesandro, “Global Economic 
Governance and the Private Sector: The League of Nations’ Experiment in the 1920s,” in The 
Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration: Power, Institutions, and Global Markets, 1850-
1930, ed. Niels P. Petersson and Christof Dejung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013); Druelle-Korn, “The Great War. Matrix of the International Chamber of Commerce, a 
Fortunate Business League of Nations” 
47 Druelle-Korn, “The Great War. Matrix of the International Chamber of Commerce, a Fortunate 
Business League of Nations,” 115. 
48 See for example: Albrecht Ritschl, Deutschlands Krise Und Konjunktur 1924-1934: 
Binnenkonjunktur, Auslandsverschuldung Und Reparationsproblem Zwischen Dawes-Plan Und 
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analysis of ICC records from the vantage point of transnational history will thus 
close important gaps in interwar economic and business history. 
 
 
5.  Concepts and Approach  
5.1 Transnational History of Business Diplomacy  
This dissertation is based on the methodologies of transnational and global history 
and relies on an interdisciplinary approach. In contrast to international history, 
transnational history is transcending the nation-state and investigating how non-
state actors like companies and NGOs have shaped global processes through the 
choice of its research unit and archival material.49 The history of globalisation 
focusses on concrete actors and how they were involved in setting up and 
implementing certain circulatory regimes, i.e. the structures that enhanced or 
controlled different kinds of flows across borders.50 Such an approach, which 
transcends common spatial formats and analyses archival material beyond 
national provenience, allows for a demystification of globalisation, which is then 
not seen as a disembodied natural force, but shaped by tangible actors that pursue 
specific “globalisation projects”.51  
 
Multinational firms have been the most important drivers of globalisation since 
the nineteenth century.52 Hence, a conceptual and methodological approach that 
centres its analysis on the specific agency of a global business association in 
shaping cross-border flows of capital and goods “will allow for (…) more relevant 
 
Transfersperre (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2002); Gomes, German Reparations, 1919-1932; Clavin, 
Securing the World Economy. 
49 Sebastian Conrad, What Is Global History? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 44–
45. 
50 Pierre-Yves Saunier, “Globalization,” in The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History, ed. 
Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 460. 
51 Claudia Baumann, Antje Dietze, and Megan Maruschke, “Portals of Globalization – an 
Introduction,” Portals of Globalization in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Double special issue of 
Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 27, 3-4 
(2017): 10. 
52 Marten Boon, “Business Enterprise and Globalization: Towards a Transnational Business 




perspectives on the history of globalization and global change.”53 The ICC borders 
diplomatic, economic and business history and can only adequately be grasped 
from an interdisciplinary point of view.54 Thus, beyond a transnational lens on 
business history, my research is informed by current discussions in International 
Relations about the supposedly recent emergence of big business as a diplomatic 
actor, and a theoretical approach which emphasises “actor- and relations-centred 
perspectives on state and corporate power in the global system”.55 My analysis will 
similarly be focussed on the agency of the ICC as a representative of global 
business, and will situate the Chamber’s actions in the relational web it forged 
with governments and the League of Nations. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
this definition of “business diplomacy” is the most valuable, as it highlights the 
agency of business in shaping globalisation, which is oftentimes only told as a story 
of anonymous price convergence.56 
 
An investigation of the ICC’s involvement in interwar international relations thus 
sheds a new light on the global scale of chambers of commerce’s influence on 
politics and historicises concepts like business diplomacy in International 
Relations. It further illuminates dynamics of globalisation by emphasising the 
historical agency of transnational actors through analysing ICC archival material 
which has seldomly been evaluated before.  
 
5.2 Discussion of Primary Sources  
The following analysis is based on various publications and conference proceedings 
of the ICC as well as material from the Economic and Financial Organisation of 
the League of Nations. The ICC published various kinds of documents and made 
the proceedings of their congresses available to the public after each meeting. The 
proceedings of the congresses and of international conferences in which the ICC 
 
53 Boon, “Business Enterprise and Globalization: Towards a Transnational Business History,” 
534. 
54 Druelle-Korn, “The Great War. Matrix of the International Chamber of Commerce, a Fortunate 
Business League of Nations,” 103. 
55 Milan Babic, Jan Fichtner, and Eelke M. Heemskerk, “States Versus Corporations: Rethinking 
the Power of Business in International Politics,” The International Spectator 52, no. 4 (2017): 22. 
56 Jeffrey Williamson, “Globalization, Convergence, and History,” The Journal of Economic 
History 56, no. 2 (1996). 
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participated are the most important primary sources which will inform my 
analysis. They not only show which resolutions were passed, but also give an 
intimate account of the decision-making process and divergent attitudes, thereby 
providing a valuable perspective on the ideas which influenced ICC actions and 
how others responded to them. 
 
Furthermore, the ICC published Digests, Brochures, the “Record”, and, from 1924 
onwards, “The Journal of the International Chamber of Commerce”, which was 
later called “World Trade”. ICC Digests were published to provide information on 
specific topics in a “concise manner”, the “Record” should give an overview of the 
activities of the ICC and its National Committees to inform the public, while 
Brochures dealt with specialised subjects and were targeting ICC member 
organisations.57 There are some gaps concerning the availability of archival 
material. For example, I could not access the full proceedings of the 1925 congress 
of the ICC. I have, however, analysed speeches, resolutions passed at the congress, 
brochures aiming at specific topics discussed at the congress, and reports by 
organisational members, which allowed me to grasp the most relevant points of 
discussion, especially concerning the question of reparations settlements.58 The 
analysis is further buttressed by secondary literature on ICC members, for 
example biographies, memoirs and the official history of the ICC, “Merchants of 
Peace”.59 My analysis will thus include primary documents by the ICC which were 
deemed for publication, others which were only aimed at the information of ICC 
members, and contemporary third-party assessments of the contributions of ICC 
 
57 International Chamber of Commerce, The Organization of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. Brochure No. 20. 1922, 10. 
58 See for example: International Chamber of Commerce, Third Congress of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, Brussels. 21-27 June 1925, United Nations Archives Geneva. 
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members to international negotiations. During my analysis, I will keep the 
differences between the respective kinds of documents in mind and assess all 
primary sources critically in their historical context.60 
 
In addition, I consulted the United Nations Archive which is providing digital 
access to most of the archival material of the League of Nations through its “Total 
Digital Access to the League of Nations Archives Project” (LONTAD). Because of 
the close cooperation between the League and the ICC, many ICC documents are 
also accessible through the League archives and the material reveals the 
institutional connections between League and ICC.  
 
 
6. Financial Globalisation Before and After World War One 
The outbreak of World War One in 1914 is commonly interpreted as the end of the 
first era of globalisation, defined as the transatlantic convergence of wages and 
prices, which began in 1870.61 By the turn of the twentieth century, the 
economically most important countries adhered to the gold standard, which 
created a system of fixed exchange rates that fostered trade. Interest rates across 
countries converged and capital flows were relatively free. World War One broke 
the credibility of the gold standard, economic policies were increasingly oriented 
at political goals, while capital controls and competitive devaluations of currencies 
became more common.62 The gold standard lost its credibility after the war 
because central bank cooperation did not pick up again and because the war 
strengthened organised labour, which meant that monetary policies could not only 
be directed towards a stable balance of payments but also had to consider issues 
such as unemployment.63 Sir Arthur Salter, the first head of the Economic and 
Financial Section at the League’s Secretariat, who worked closely together with 
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63 Eichengreen, Golden Fetters, 9. 
15 
 
the ICC, summed up the nostalgia of many leading technocrats and 
businesspeople about this seemingly lost age of globalisation at the dawn of the 
Great Depression: “By comparison with 1929, the world of 1913 seemed to most of 
us a paradise from which we had for a time been excluded by a flaming sword.”64 
Just like Salter, the members of the ICC did everything they could to return to the 
lost paradise of free trade and unfettered capital mobility.  
 
6.1 ICC Positions on International Finance and the Ter Meulen Scheme 
Almost all countries experienced unprecedented inflation rates in the immediate 
post-war years, when reconstruction began, demand surged, and many countries 
continued to pursue loose financial policies.65 Thus, in its early years, the ICC 
devoted all its resources “to the recovery of the equilibrium of the exchanges upon 
which commerce and international credit, in fact, the restoration of the world, 
depends”, as Etienne Clementél, the founding president of the ICC, proclaimed at 
the Chamber’s first congress.66 From its inception onwards until the outbreak of 
the Great Depression, the ICC recommended four principal remedies to return to 
pre-war financial globalisation: central bank cooperation, a return to the gold 
standard, balanced budgets, and dismantling barriers against the mobility of 
capital and goods.67   
 
The Ter Meulen scheme, named after the Dutch banker who designed it, was a 
reconstruction plan for Austria, and it was first presented at the 1920 Brussels 
Finance Conference. It serves as an interesting example of the early work of the 
ICC, as it already reveals the fundamental principles that the ICC subscribed to 
in financial matters, which also guided its work on the reparations question. The 
Ter Meulen scheme was discussed at the first congress of the ICC in 1921 and both 
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its principal organisers, Ter Meulen and Drummond Fraser, were members of the 
ICC and present at the first congress.68   
 
The plan entailed an international credit system with strings attached, an early 
form of a structural adjustment programme. Ter Meulen bonds should act as a 
security for traders in crisis-ridden countries such as Austria and spur investor 
confidence to direct long-term private credit to the country. The bonds are issued 
by the government against Austrian customs revenue and mortgaged to the real 
property of the country, while Austria must pay interest of four percent to the 
foreign owners of these bonds.69 The Ter Meulen bonds could only be used to 
import production goods and the countries which would be supplied with the bonds 
were obliged to return to the gold standard, balance their budget “within a 
reasonable period” and remove “all hampering commercial restrictions”.70 
Furthermore, the public finances of the debtor country “would come under control 
of the International Commission, whose duty it would be to constitute a sinking 
fund”.71 
 
Interestingly, the ICC imagined that not the creditor states, but the League of 
Nations should act as the supervisor of the whole plan.72 In the eyes of the ICC 
members, the Financial Section of the League was a benevolent institution, which 
was mostly guided by technocratic expertise instead of national interest.73 The 
ICC unanimously supported the Ter Meulen Scheme at its first congress and 
further recommended the establishment of a committee of businessmen from its 
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own ranks which should cooperate with the League, “to furnish all information 
and to lend all assistance in the choice of credits and participations”.74  
 
In the end, the Ter Meulen scheme was not accepted at the Brussels Finance 
conference, despite the support of the ICC. Creditor nations, such as the USA, 
were not ready to contribute to the collective supervision of the plan.75 However, 
the plan still reveals which convictions guided ICC recommendations and how it 
tried to push its agenda internationally. The ICC tried to forge close relations with 
the League to attain its goals, by positioning its members at important posts. Both 
Drummond Fraser and Ter Meulen, the organisers of the credit scheme, were 
members of the ICC and worked for the League simultaneously.76 The same also 
applies to the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, who was an important 
ICC expert on international finance and early contributor to the economic work of 
the League.77 Further, the discussions about the Ter Meulen scheme show why 
the League is the preferred partner of the ICC.  ICC members were critics of 
“excessive” national sovereignty, and the barriers against the “movement of 
travellers, of capital and of goods”, which were erected by new nation-states after 
the end of World War One.78 Just as Austrian School economists like Ludwig von 
Mises, who worked closely together with the ICC, the Chamber saw the League as 
the prime vehicle to impose a global institutional order which should safeguard 
private property and allow for the smooth circulation of goods and capital around 
the world, which was impeded by national regulation.79 The principal task of the 
ICC was to make “Europe safe for investors”, by curtailing political interference 
into economic life as far as possible.80 This explains the ICC’s preference for the 
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League as a supervisor and the stringent conditions of the Ter Meulen scheme, 
which would have severely curtailed the political room for manoeuvre of nation-
states. Finally, the deliberations of the ICC on the financial reconstruction of 
Austria prepared important ICC members for the formulation of a solution for the 
biggest problem in international finance during the interwar period: reparations.81  
 
6.2 The Struggle about Reparations up until the Dawes Plan  
To finance the war, the Entente borrowed massively from the United States. Until 
the armistice, Britain took on $3.7 billion in American loans, France $2 billion, 
and Italy approximately $1 billion. Especially France continued to borrow from 
the USA on a large scale after the end of the war.82 The US refused to cancel some 
of the outstanding debt, which, inter alia, steered France in the direction of 
demanding harsh reparations from Germany.83  The total of reparations 
surmounted to 132 billion Reichsmark or 32 billion US Dollars in 1921, amounting 
to 300 per cent of German GDP at the time.84  
 
Because the final reparations bill was much higher than the expected 80 billion 
Reichsmark, German citizens reacted with a tax boycott, while the central bank 
lowered interest rates to decrease borrowing costs at the price of inflation.85 
Germany only delivered a bare minimum to the allies, who responded with the 
occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 to enforce reparation payments.86 The occupation 
resulted in passive resistance by the German workers in the Ruhr and no side, 
neither France nor Germany, could claim substantial victory. Hence, France 
agreed to the proposition of US Secretary of State, Charles Hughes, to let 
independent experts work out the reparations problem. As a result, on 30 
November 1923, two reparations committees were appointed, staffed with 
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reputable international businessmen. The Dawes and McKenna committees 
started their work in January 1924 and the Dawes Plan, which would settle 
Germany’s reparations up until 1929, was published on 9 April 1924.87  
 
6.3 The ICC and the Dawes Plan  
The Dawes Plan entailed a new publicly endorsed loan to boost investor confidence 
and the installation of a Transfer Committee, led by the Agent General for 
Reparations to supervise the transfer of payments and keep the German currency 
stable.88 Most importantly, the Dawes Plan made Germany’s foreign transfers 
conditional on its capacity to pay, inscribed in the so-called “transfer protection 
clause”.89 The clause implied that the repayment of commercial credit ranked 
ahead of reparation payments: If foreign exchange would only be available for the 
payments of interest on commercial debt, but not anymore for the transfer of 
reparations, then only the former would be paid by Germany.90 Consequently, 
German corporations and the public sector experienced a massive influx of private 
capital, and Germany could pay its reparations solely through recycling private 
credit.91 The money predominantly came from the USA. Between 1925 and 1928, 
American investors lent between 1.294 and 1.772 milliards Reichsmark to 
Germany annually (4.2 Reichsmark = 1$).92 American bondholders felt safe 
because of the transfer protection clause and were attracted by the high yields of 
up to 8.7 percent on average, while the German government deliberately pursued 
a strategy to take on as much private credit as possible to deepen foreign creditors’ 
dependency on Germany’s financial solidity and thereby increasing its leverage in 
future negotiations.93 It was mainly Germany that profited from transfer 
protection, and the economic historian Albrecht Ritschl rightfully asks why any of 
the other parties involved agreed to such a scheme, without giving a conclusive 
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answer.94 A closer look at the interests and institutional affiliation of the people 
who negotiated the Dawes Plan, namely ICC members, reveals why transfer 
protection was included. 
 
Owen D. Young, member of the Dawes Committee, was “the principal architect of 
the Dawes Plan”.95 Additionally, Young was also a high-ranking member of the 
ICC. He was one of the alternate members of the Council and part of the US 
National Committee.96 Henry M. Robinson, the second of the three American 
representatives on the Dawes and McKenna committees, was also a member of 
the ICC council.97 Young and Robinson “dominated the conference (…) because 
they had behind them the indispensable power of American finance.”98 Alberto 
Pirelli, who was also a Council member and would become the ICC’s president in 
1927, joined Owen D. Young as a member of the Dawes Committee.99 In sum, five 
of fifteen representatives at the Dawes and McKenna committees were members 
of the ICC, while Josiah Stamp (Dawes Committee) joined the ICC shortly after 
the end of the negotiations.100 
 
Not only was the formulation of the Dawes Plan strongly influenced by important 
ICC members, but the transfer protection clause also emanated from the ICC. 
Fred. I. Kent, the US Bankers Trust Vice-President and chairman of the ICC’s 
Economic Restoration Committee, of which Owen D. Young was a member too,101 
suggested the seniority of private commercial credit for the first time at the Rome 
Congress of the ICC in 1923, one year before the conclusion of the Dawes Plan:  
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“A loan to Germany could not be placed in the United States today, and 
no such loan can probably be placed in America that does not come ahead 
of reparations for many years. (…) A loan to Germany of sufficient size 
to restore her economic situation on a sound basis and enable her to 
make progress toward paying reparations, and which came ahead of 
reparations, (…) would be absolutely good, and if it were being made at 
the request and for the benefit of the European Allied countries, it could 
undoubtedly be placed in the United States.”102 
 
Fred I. Kent was also the most important figure in rallying support for the Dawes 
loan, as soon as the plan was published.103 Both the seniority of commercial credit 
and the public support for the Dawes loan rendered the initial public offering of 
the Dawes bonds immensely successful: “The American tranche of $110 million 
was vastly oversubscribed and sold in 15 minutes.”104 Hence, the influence of the 
ICC was instrumental in formulating and implementing the Dawes Plan. Most 
importantly, the inclusion of the crucial transfer protection clause which led to the 
large credit flows from America to Germany from 1924 onwards can be traced back 
to the Rome Congress of the ICC in the preceding year.105  
 
Evidence for the enduring influence of the ICC on the implementation of the 
Dawes Plan can also be found. At its congress in 1925, the Chamber set up a 
“Committee on International Settlements” that studied reparations and 
international debts and engaged with the official institutions that dealt with the 
matter.106 At the same congress, the Agent General for Reparations, Seymour 
Parker Gilbert, held a speech in which he acknowledged the positive influence of 
the Chamber on the negotiations.107 Further, there was a continuous informal 
cooperation between the ICC and the Transfer Committee, installed under the 
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Dawes Plan. For instance, the latter met with the ICC Committee on International 
Settlements in 1926 “at a luncheon given by Mr. Pirelli, which was followed by an 
equally informal meeting during which the members of the two Committees had 
an opportunity to exchange views.”108  
 
In previous works on the Dawes Plan, it is commonly stated, that the plan was 
heavily influenced by the interests of American business that acted with the tacit 
support of the US government.109 It is, however, only seldomly noted that many of 
the influential businessmen, who designed the Dawes Plan, knew each other 
through the ICC and could draw on previous works of the Chamber, such as the 
Ter Meulen scheme, to shape the Dawes Plan according to the interests of the 
international business community. The analysis of the deliberations and 
publications of the ICC shows that the Dawes Plan was structurally similar to the 
Ter Meulen scheme and that it should serve the same purpose. Like the latter, the 
Dawes Plan obliged Germany to return to the gold standard, balance its budget, 
and placed part of its public finances under the supervision of the Transfer 
Committee.110 Both plans had the same goal of enabling and encouraging private 
capital to flow to the respective countries. The Dawes Plan can thus be seen as the 
later realisation of the earlier stated convictions of the Chamber on financial 
stability and the needed primacy of private capital for economic reconstruction. 
With the Dawes Plan, the ICC created a new “circulatory regime” that massively 
increased the cross-border flows of capital through the provision of seniority to 
commercial claims, whereby the Chamber became one of the most important 
agents of financial globalisation in the 1920s.111 The recommencement of 
international capital movements on a large scale and the massive increase of 
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American FDI in Europe between 1924 and 1929 was institutionally buttressed 
by the Dawes Plan, and thus also by the ICC.112 The ICC provided an institutional 
infrastructure that allowed for the formation of a globally unanimous voice of 
business, continuous research on international capital movements, and the 
implementation of the plan through an international network that rallied support 
for the successful flotation of the Dawes loan. 
 
It was, however, not possible to get the League involved in the plan, as “the 
European powers (…) wanted to keep reparations away from the meddling of the 
League of Nations”.113 Hence, after the Dawes Plan stabilised exchange rates and 
jumpstarted capital mobility, the ICC turned to a new primary task: the promotion 
of free trade. In this area, it would collaborate very closely with the Economic and 
Financial Organisation of the League of Nations to achieve its goals. 
 
 
7. The Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations 
When the League was founded in 1919, it was not supposed to engage with 
economic or financial matters, as most politicians envisaged a quick return to the 
pre-war gold standard and relatively free trade.114 However, the rampant inflation 
in many parts of Europe, the rise in unemployment, and the collapse of 
international trade showed that there was a growing need for institutional 
international cooperation in the economic realm, which is why member states 
agreed to create an Economic and Financial Section at the League’s Secretariat 
after the Brussels Finance Conference in 1920.115 The newly formed section was 
coined “Joint Provisional Economic and Financial Committee” and it should 
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comprise “independent experts”, nominated by the Council of the League, who did 
not need to represent national governments.116  
 
It was not until 1923 when the word “provisional” was dropped and the permanent 
Economic and Financial Committee, which possessed the exclusive mandate to 
formulate policy recommendations for the Assembly and the Council of the 
League, was created. This committee became central to the work of the Economic 
and Financial Organisation (EFO) of the League.117 The EFO was one of three 
specialized organisations of the League dedicated to economic and social policy 
fields. Unlike the International Labour Organization, however, these 
“organisations” had no independent status and were bodies within the League.118  
 
The EFO evolved over time and “rather than a cohesive entity, EFO was the sum 
of a number of committees, whose individual routine work proceeded 
uncoordinated for most of the interwar period.”119 The Economic and Financial 
Section of the League’s Secretariat was the most important organ in this complex 
web of League bodies concerned with the world economy. The officials of the 
Economic and Financial Section guided the work of the EFO by writing annotated 
agendas for session meetings, drafting the committee reports which included 
policy recommendations, and setting the agenda of discussion by promoting 
particular resolutions.120 The Economic and Financial Section was the only 
permanent body of the EFO and it was led by Sir Arthur Salter up until 1931.121 
With the creation of the EFO, there was for the first time ever an institution that 
monitored and analysed the world economy, and which “made up the biggest part 
of the multilateral system of governance in economic, monetary, and social affairs 
during the interwar years”.122  
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Although it was emphasised from its inception onwards that membership in the 
committees of the EFO was awarded based on expertise instead of political 
allegiance, governments tried to position people in the committees which would 
support national policies.123 Diverging national politics led to deadlock on many 
issues, which is why from 1925 onwards, the EFO tried to achieve its goals through 
private sector involvement in its work. Especially private actors who wielded 
significant influence were seen as valuable allies in convincing national 
governments to support worldwide economic cooperation.124 The ICC would 
become one of the most important private actors that collaborated with the EFO. 
 
7.1 The ICC and the League 
The successful work of national chambers of commerce depends on the effective 
maintenance of a strong presence at the centres of power. This includes forging 
close interconnections with sympathetic politicians and decision-makers to employ 
the best-connected members of the chamber as “delegates” who would draw 
attention to specific topics at the highest level.125 The same applies to the ICC in 
a double sense. On the one hand, the ICC was able to exert pressure on national 
governments through its National Committees. On the other hand, the ICC was 
from its creation onwards keen on forging ties with the League of Nations. In the 
following I will retrace how the ICC became influential within the EFO and 
describe how its influence increased and eventually culminated in the preparation 
of the World Economic Conference in 1927. 
 
Etienne Clementél, the founding president of the ICC, established close links with 
the League in the early 1920s. He knew the first president of the League, Léon 
Bourgeois, very well, as both men were members of the same political party 
in France.126 It was Clementél, who proposed that the ICC might “perform a useful 
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function as an auxiliary to the Economic Committee of the League of Nations, 
acting in an advisory capacity” in January 1921 already.127 Before any official 
cooperation between the League and the ICC was agreed upon, the ICC had 
already established an informal channel of influence through Alberto Pirelli. 
Pirelli was a member of the Economic Committee of the League since 1921, headed 
the Italian National Committee of the ICC, and was also the Vice-President of the 
Chamber for many years, before becoming its president in 1927.128 Pirelli became 
the “chief liaison officer” of the Economic Committee of the League in 1922, 
charged with the ongoing cooperation between the ICC and the League.129 It is 
thus not surprising that only a year later, the Chamber was invited to send 
delegates to the conference on export formalities and that it was officially asked 
by the Economic Committee to prepare reports which were discussed at the 
conference.130 The president of the Chamber was involved in drawing up the 
protocol of the conference, which was then signed by all the delegations, including 
the one of the ICC, which put a private organisation on the same level as states in 
terms of diplomatic protocol for the first time.131  
 
Besides the overlap of leading personnel between the EFO and the ICC, which 
enabled the Chamber to exert a high degree of influence on the League’s workings, 
members of both organisations were also ideologically on the same page. The 
Secretariat of the League and the EFO “was staffed almost entirely by proponents 
of classical liberalism, for whom free trade was an article of faith”.132  The same 
applies to the ICC, which had already stated at its first congress that “it is in the 
interest of international trade (…) that (…) interference and regulation of business 
should be reduced to a minimum in order that the normal forces of private and 
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competitive business be permitted to operate and produce their salutary 
effects”.133 
 
From the second half of the 1920s onwards, the ICC would lobby fiercely for the 
adoption of the most-favoured-nation clause, longer trade treaties, lower tariffs, 
the abolition of non-tariff barriers, and the unification of customs 
nomenclatures.134 In short, after capital was enabled to cross borders again 
through the Dawes Plan, the same should apply to commodities, so that the 
relatively free exchange of goods which characterised the first era of globalisation 
in the late nineteenth century could resume. To achieve this, the ICC worked 
closely together with the League to organise the World Economic Conference in 
1927, “the first economic gathering to take the entire world as its subject.”135  
 
7.2 The ICC at the World Economic Conference 1927 
The World Economic Conference of 1927, held under the auspices of the League, 
would become the peak of the ICC’s influence in interwar diplomacy, as the 
conference was dominated by its agenda and its delegates. In the following I will 
first report and analyse the most important results of the conference. 
Subsequently, I will scrutinise the concrete channels of influence through which 
the ICC was able to push its agenda at the conference.  
 
European protectionism and tariff policy were the most important subjects 
discussed at the conference. These topics had become increasingly significant 
during the 1920s, as free trade was gradually abandoned.136 Sir Arthur Salter, the 
influential head of the League’s Economic and Financial Section, made sure that 
the preparatory committee for the conference was staffed predominantly with pro-
free trade experts.137 Hence, many influential ICC members joined the committee, 
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including Alberto Pirelli, Sir Arthur Balfour, who was the official observer of the 
ICC at the preparatory committee, and multiple members of the ICC’s Trade 
Barriers Committee.138 The report of the Trade Barriers Committee became one of 
the most influential documents at the conference, which “formed the foundation of 
the Conference’s great achievement”, as Salter remarked at the Stockholm 
Congress of the ICC only a few months after the World Economic Conference.139 
The report consisted of a survey of the principal trade barriers in each country, 
provided by the National Committees, and policy recommendations on how to 
overcome them.140  
 
All in all, the World Economic Conference followed the recommendations of the 
ICC and declared that “the time has come to put an end to the increase in tariffs 
and to move in the opposite direction”.141 Walter Runciman, delegate of the 
Chamber at the conference, remarked during the discussions of the conference’s 
Sub-Committee on Tariffs and Commercial Treaties that he “found it a striking 
tribute to the work of the Trade Barriers Committee of the International Chamber 
of Commerce that one or other of all their principles had been endorsed in all those 
speeches.”142 In its report, the ICC recommended the abolition of import and 
export prohibitions (quotas), the worldwide unification of customs nomenclatures, 
the abolition of imposing tariffs before negotiations (so-called “tariffs de combat”), 
the general lowering of tariff levels, the application of the unconditional most-
favoured nation clause, tariff stability through the conclusion of commercial 
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treaties with a longer duration, and a new multilateral approach to commercial 
treaty negotiations.143  
 
The influence of the ICC at the conference had limits, however. The Sub-
Committee on Tariffs and Commercial Treaties decided to take a French proposal 
on a new tariff system as a basis for discussion, while it was also proclaimed to 
“weave into it various proposals of the International Chamber of Commerce”.144 
The French proposal was less liberal than the recommendations by the ICC and 
included a clause which allowed for “protection limited to counterbalancing more 
favourable conditions of production or a more advantageous regime of prices in the 
principal competing country”.145 Protectionism should be allowed to be pursued to 
safeguard “national security or the vital interests of economic life”.146 The ICC 
members proposed either a yearly reduction of tariffs at a set percentage rate or a 
maximum level of tariffs, which the French delegation saw as impracticable, as 
countries should be allowed to protect its domestic industries if other countries 
had more favourable production conditions.147 This was heavily opposed by the 
ICC delegate, M. de Lavergne, and Gustav Cassel, who was also affiliated to the 
ICC. Cassell argued that the whole aim of trying to equal out different costs of 
production was futile, as this was the economic reality on which the necessity of 
international trade depended.148 Because of the strong opposition from the ICC 
delegates and the British and American delegations, the French delegation 
replaced its idea of “counterbalancing tariffs” with a much more vague formulation 
that urged countries to “reduce protective tariffs to equitable and moderate rates, 
and thus to encourage the extension of trade and at the same time to secure fair 
remuneration for the producer and increase the purchasing power of the 
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consumer”.149 France’s position at the conference, which eventually softened, 
reflected the fear of German competition in important areas such as chemicals and 
metals, where French tariff rates in 1926 were up to 50 percent higher than in 
1913.150 
 
Besides the controversy about the room for manoeuvre of states to impose tariffs, 
most other recommendations of the ICC were adopted at the conference. Most 
importantly, the conference endorsed the inclusion of the unconditional most-
favoured-nation clause in commercial treaties, which passes trade privileges 
between two countries onto all other countries with which the two had most-
favoured-nation agreements, in conjunction with a recommendation for the 
prolongation of trade treaties.151 Additionally, the conference adopted the ICC 
recommendation on the need for a unified customs nomenclature152 and endorsed 
the abolition of non-tariff barriers to trade, such as quotas and “unjustified health 
regulations”.153 The resolutions passed at the World Economic Conference were 
closely aligned with the recommendations of the ICC, and the conference can thus 
be interpreted as a success of concerted business diplomacy by the Chamber. 
Hence, the outcome of the conference cannot only be traced back to “the agency of 
the League”,154 but also to the work of the ICC. But how was the ICC exactly able 
to influence the results of the conference according to its views? 
 
7.3 Channels of Influence at the World Economic Conference 
It was clear to all participants, that the ICC was the most important non-state 
organisation present at the conference. Georges Theunis, the president of the 
World Economic Conference,  mentioned “in particular” the International 
Chamber of Commerce, “whose written and personal contributions (…) have 
throughout been of the greatest assistance”.155 Theunis himself was a member of 
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the ICC and would become the Chamber’s president in 1929, which suggests his 
sympathy to its agenda.156 He would also become the president of the League’s 
Economic Consultative Committee in 1927, which was formed to watch over the 
implementation of the passed resolutions at the conference.157 
 
Thus, in addition to the Trade Barriers Committee’s report, the influence of the 
ICC can be discerned through the size of the Chamber’s delegation and the 
important posts its members occupied. First, Sir Arthur Balfour from the ICC was 
a vice-president of the conference, and the American member of the ICC, Roland 
Boyden, was the vice-president of the Commerce Commission at the conference. 
Boyden was the only delegate at such a high post who would not represent a 
country but an organisation at the conference.158 Second, 36 of the 157 official 
experts came from the ICC and 32 of the 194 delegates to the conference “were 
among the most active members of the Council and the Committees of the 
International Chamber”.159 Additionally, many ICC members were participating 
at the conference as national delegates. For example, Richard Riedl, one of the 
most influential trade experts from the ICC, was attending the conference as a 
member of the Austrian national delegation.160 John O’Leary, the president of the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, represented the US government.161 This 
assured attaining the desired results for the ICC at the conference.  For instance, 
Gustav Cassel, a member of the EFO and the ICC, attended the conference as a 
Swedish national delegate and was a member of the Commerce Committee. 
Accordingly, he asserted at the committee’s meeting that “practical results could 
most easily be attained if the Committee started with the series of 
recommendations drawn up by the Trade Barriers Committee of the International 
Chamber of Commerce”.162   
 
156 International Chamber of Commerce, Proceedings of the Congress. Amsterdam, July 1929, 
138. 
157 Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace, 254. 
158 League of Nations, The World Economic Conference. Final Report. 1927, 57. 
159 International Chamber of Commerce, Journal of the International Chamber of Commerce. No. 
14. May–June 1927, LSE Library. HF294, 6. 
160 League of Nations, The World Economic Conference. Final Report. 1927, 59. 
161 Ibid., 63. 




In sum, the ICC supplied one of the most important documents for the preparation 
of the conference, a later ICC president was the president of the Conference, the 
ICC sent a large share of experts, it was officially represented at the most 
important commission, and many participants who attended in their capacity as 
national delegates were also ICC members. Through these numerous channels of 
influence, the ICC was able to successfully make the conference follow its agenda 
on commercial policy which consisted in a return to pre-war tariff levels and the 
abolition of trade barriers. However, although the conference was hailed as the 
“beginning of a new era, during which international commerce will successively 
overcome all obstacles in its path that unduly hamper it, and resume that general 
upward movement”,163 it was not able to combat the protectionist drift during the 
late 1920s and early 1930s. Simultaneously, the influence of the ICC on global 
economic policy decreased shortly after the conference. The next section will 
explore the causes for these developments. 
 
 
8. The Great Depression and the Demise of Business Diplomacy  
In 1927, it looked as if the efforts of the International Chamber of Commerce had 
come to fruition and that the economic dislocations of World War One would be 
overcome. Capital was global again; the net capital outflow from the largest 
creditor countries increased from $639 million in 1923 and peaked at $2,241 
million in 1928.164 Further, it seemed that international trade would pick up. In 
the immediate aftermath of the World Economic Conference, 30 new commercial 
treaties were negotiated within a year, with another 42 following the next year. 
However, all new treaties were concluded for only a year, whereas it was common 
to have treaties that would last 10 to 12 years before World War One.165 Capital 
mobility would decline sharply from 1928 onwards, and with the beginning of the 
Great Depression the ICC would lose its significance.  
 
163 Salter, The World Economic Conference of May 1927: How to Secure Practical Results. 
Address delivered to the Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce at Stockholm on 
July 1st, 1927. Brochure No. 58. 1927, 14–15. 
164 Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919–1929, 248. 
165 Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization, 177–78. 
33 
 
The protectionist tendencies in the world economy could not be broken through 
the efforts of the World Economic Conference due to several reasons. First, because 
the unconditional most-favoured-nation treatment could not yield successful 
results in a protectionist environment. If two countries would agree on tariff 
reductions bilaterally, these reductions would immediately be passed onto 
countries that retained high tariff levels, which diminished future bargaining 
positions.166 The adoption of a multilateral trade treaty negotiation structure, 
similar to the GATT, could have been a remedy against this problem, as suggested 
by ICC member Richard Riedl at the World Economic Conference.167 Second, no 
long-term improvements followed the conference. The members of the Economic 
Consultative Committee of the League stated their disappointment about the 
“meagre application of the policy of the World Economic Conference” in 1929.168 
Trade barriers were not dissolved lastingly, although League technocrats and ICC 
representatives could convincingly show that European protectionism was a major 
reason for the slower economic growth in Europe compared to the US.169  
 
Tariffs remained high, because many European countries in the interwar period 
were willing to endure welfare losses to attain other goals, like protecting “their 
vital interests of economic life”, as the French delegate at the World Economic 
Conference argued, or alleviate unemployment, which became a much bigger 
problem in the post-war period, as many “redundant” workers from Europe could 
not emigrate to the United States anymore.170 Additionally, transatlantic trade 
also slumped. The American Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930 marked the climax of 
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rising protectionism in the USA. Tariffs and the decreased demand after the 1929 
Wall Street crash reduced the net worth of US imports and exports by roughly 70 
percent between 1929 and 1932 and rendered negotiations about general tariff 
reductions even more difficult.171   
 
The ICC was not able to counterbalance these trends, because it lost the most 
valuable asset a chamber of commerce can have: its unanimous voice. There was 
disunity within the Chamber on the question of how to combat the increasing 
protectionism in the early 1930s. The Austrian National Committee of the ICC 
advocated for exceptions to the most-favoured-nation treatment, with the goal to 
create a European customs union or other regional trade blocs.172 This proposal 
was met with fierce resistance by the influential American National Committee, 
which rightfully saw such an approach as a possibility to discriminate against 
American imports to forge European economic unity.173 The American view 
prevailed and at the 1931 congress, the ICC passed a resolution in which it stated 
that it had “considered” the declaration of some National Committees which 
supported exceptions to the most-favoured nation clause, but that the Chamber 
also “re-affirms its strong conviction of the necessity of most favoured nation 
treatment as a first principle in commercial policy”.174 As the Great Depression 
deepened, some members of the ICC, such as the French Committee, even uttered 
support for import quotas to protect national industries.175 Because of this rift 
within the ICC on how to combat protectionism, it was unable to voice an 
unequivocal position on commercial policy, which significantly hampered its 
capacity to influence governments and the League towards reducing trade 
barriers.  
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The collapse of world trade coincided with a severe blow to financial globalisation, 
which started with the 1929 stock market crash and gathered full force with the 
German banking and currency crisis in 1931. The large capital flows from the US 
to Europe heightened the reliance of German banks on dollar-denominated short-
term credit to finance long-term domestic investments, which rendered them 
extremely vulnerable to a reversal of capital flows that took place as soon stock 
market volatility increased globally in 1929.176 The seniority of private credit 
under the Dawes Plan, the inclusion of which can be traced back to the ICC, was 
one of the reasons why a transatlantic credit boom took place from 1924 onwards 
and why the Great Depression could so easily be transmitted to Europe in the 
early 1930s.177 As American capital flows reversed in 1931 and Germany’s largest 
banks were on the brink of failure, the German government enacted capital 
controls and took over a large share of the most vulnerable banks. Capital controls 
then transmitted the crisis to Britain and forced the country off the gold standard, 
a trend which other countries would follow during the 1930s.178 The coinciding 
breakdown of economic and financial globalisation reduced the opportunity costs 
of pursuing a policy of debt default and autarky, which new extremist political 
leaders such as the Nazis in Germany welcomed, leading to a downward spiral of 
economic disintegration.179 
 
The sheer magnitude of the Great Depression, “a tsunami that was about to sweep 
away the financial and monetary foundations of the world economy”,180 led to the 
demise of business diplomacy by the ICC. The cessation of private American 
lending ushered in such deep a crisis that governments became the decisive actors 
in international economic relations. From 1931 onwards, private advisors to the 
EFO of the League were gradually displaced by government experts.181 Arthur 
 
176 Straumann, 1931, 153; Acominotti and Eichengreen, “The Mother of All Sudden Stops: Capital 
Flows and Reversals in Europe, 1919–32,”  472. 
177 Acominotti and Eichengreen find quantitative evidence for the fact that more capital flowed to 
Germany under the Dawes Plan, see Acominotti and Eichengreen, “The Mother of All Sudden 
Stops: Capital Flows and Reversal in Europe, 1919–32,” 484.  
178 Olivier Accominotti, “London Merchant Banks, the Central European Panic, and the Sterling 
Crisis of 1931,” The Journal of Economic History 72, no. 1 (2012): 29–31. 
179 Ritschl, “The German transfer problem, 1920–33: a sovereign-debt perspective,” 959. 
180 Straumann, 1931, 205. 
181 d'Allesandro, “Global Economic Governance and the Private Sector,” 268. 
36 
 
Salter, the liberal head of the Economic and Financial Section of the League 
decided to resign in 1930, as he realised that “it was now clearly outside Geneva, 
in the capitals of the world, that the (…) fate of mankind would be decided”.182 The 
ICC lost its special access to international organisations and was not invited to 
take part at the 1933 Monetary and Economic Conference in London; a stark 
contrast to the impactful role it played at the 1927 World Economic Conference.183 
The Chamber was unable to respond to the new international economic 
environment in an adequate way, which contributed to its diminished significance 
during the Great Depression. For instance, although the deficient interwar gold 
standard enhanced the deflationary shock inflicted by the global crisis and 
prolonged the Great Depression, the ICC stuck to its dogmatic and impracticable 
endorsement of a return to the gold standard, which would have severely reduced 
the scope of fiscal and monetary crisis relief.184   
 
During the second half of the 1920s, it looked like pre-war economic globalisation 
would come back stronger than it had been before, world trade and financial flows 
being greater than before 1914.185 After the World Economic Conference, it seemed 
probable that all major economies would return to liberal commercial policies. 
However, the precarious political situation in interwar Europe and the disunity 
within the ICC prevented the dissolution of trade barriers. The ensuing Great 
Depression further reduced international trade, put an end to private capital 
mobility, and increased the role of governments nationally and internationally. 
The ICC disregarded the magnitude of the tectonic shift which shook the global 
economy and only reiterated its positions on international finance which it 
proclaimed since its creation. Hence, simultaneously as the Great Depression put 
an end to economic and financial globalisation, it also disempowered one of the 
most important private agents of global interconnectedness in the interwar period. 
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9.  Conclusion  
The early history of the International Chamber of Commerce up until the Great 
Depression shows that non-state actors and business diplomacy were 
instrumental in shaping global politics in the 1920s already. I have shown that 
the “business of business” was oftentimes beyond immediate corporate concerns 
and that it was the ICC as the organised voice of global business which was one of 
the most influential agents of globalisation in the interwar period. Within the 
history of chambers of commerce, the creation of the ICC can be seen as a natural 
evolution of business pressure groups which broadened their scope over time, but 
its creation should also be interpreted as a reaction to the economic and financial 
dislocations after World War One, which necessitated a global NGO representing 
the interests of business. During the 1920s, the ICC was especially influential in 
the areas of international finance and trade, as the contributions of its members 
to the work of the Dawes Commission and its influence at the 1927 World 
Economic Conference show.   
 
By concentrating on the ICC’s influence on the outcome of the Dawes Plan, I have 
demonstrated how a focus on transnational actors may provide a new 
interpretation of the history of capital flows during the interwar period. The 
seniority of private credit over reparations originated at the Rome Congress of the 
ICC and was implemented through the participation of numerous ICC members 
at the Dawes Committee. Previous research has given no conclusive answer to the 
question why the transfer protection clause was included in the Dawes Plan. The 
analysis of archival material beyond government sources shows that it was in the 
interest of the global business community to give private credit priority and that 
the ICC was a suitable vehicle to carry this proposal through. An analysis of the 
ICC’s role in the reparations negotiations also reveals why the transatlantic credit 
boom between 1924 and 1928 took off and thus contributes to understanding the 
causes of the Great Depression.  
 
While the ICC was successful in enhancing capital mobility, it was not able to 
make governments return to relatively free trade. This can be explained by the 
38 
 
disunity within the ICC and the changed political landscape in interwar Europe. 
Although the attempt to create a more liberal global economy was not successful, 
the analysis of the ICC’s role at the World Economic Conference and its 
collaboration with the League’s EFO reveals the early importance of organised 
business within international organisations. It again highlights the agency of 
global business in the interwar period, which has often been overlooked in 
previous historical research. My analysis further illuminates the origins of a 
development that provisionally culminated in 2016, when the ICC was granted 
Observer Status at the United Nations as the first business association ever.186 
The Great Depression marked the demise of business diplomacy in the interwar 
period. During the 1920s, the ICC was one of the most influential actors that 
shaped interwar economic and financial globalisation by suggesting and 
implementing various regimes of cross-border circulation through different 
channels. Nevertheless, it could not resist the structural forces of a crisis as deep 
as the Great Depression which increased the role of government in international 
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